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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant's brief defines the correct issue and standard for

review in regards to the first question presented for appeal.

The

additional findings were presented to the trial court in the
plaintiff's response to defendant's Rule 52 motion, and, as shown
below, the trial court has no authority to enter additional
findings after judgment is entered by the court.
In regards to the third issue presented for review,
Plaintiff's suggested formulation is too restrictive, as it ignores
the other three findings which the court cited to as justifying the
award of an inequitable share of the marital estate to the
plaintiff.

If those other factors are included, either of the

parties formulation of issue 3 are adequate.
In regards to the fifth issue, plaintiff has included
unnecessary factual information in his formulation.

The question

is whether the ranch was under the jurisdiction of the court and
whether the ranch should have been included in the court's
distribution of assets.

The court clearly made the award and

factored it into its calculations regarding the distribution of
other assets.

As conceded by the plaintiff, the defendant did not

have good title to the property at the time of the divorce.
Plaintiff's Brief at 12.
In deciding whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the
ranch, determining whether property can properly be included in the
estate is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness.

1

See

Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1996).

Only

after the marital assets are determined is the trial court's
property division reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Endrody, 914 P.2d at 1168-9.
II.

FACTUAL INACCURACIES
Plaintiff in her brief attempts to introduce several issues as

to which the trial court either did not find or made no finding.
The Plaintiff attempts to introduce the notion of fault, as she did
at trial, by referring to the defendant's future wife as his
"girlfriend."

See Plaintiff's Brief at 5, 9, 12, 14, 32, 37.

The

trial court specifically found that the plaintiff had failed to
meet her burden of proof on this issue.

(R. 504).

The plaintiff further states on several occasions that the
defendant was "entitled" to receive the ranch at the time the
parties were divorced.

Plaintiff's Brief at 5.

However, it is

clear from the record that the defendant did not obtain title to
the property by inheritance from his mother until after the date of
trial.
The plaintiff also cites to the defendant's purchase of a ring
for his current wife and his failure to sell the parties Corvette
as possible further rationales for the court's inequitable award of
the marital estate in this case.

Plaintiff's Brief at 11, 14, 32.

These items were not stated by the trial court as factors in its
award of property.

The lower court did not order the Corvette to

be sold at trial as stated in Plaintiff's brief.
at 11, R. 511.
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Plaintiff's Brief

Other irrelevant items, testified to by the plaintiff, but not
found by the trial court as a basis for its decision, were cited by
the plaintiff, such as the alleged fact that the defendant was
upset at the plaintiff for working, the fact that the plaintiff
objected to the Arma-Coating business, and the fact that plaintiff
was not aware that the defendant was going to cash in his
retirement account.

Plaintiff's Brief at 7, 9, 10.

The plaintiff states that "Defendant agreed that [plaintiff]
could use the income tax refund" to purchase the condominium.
Plaintiff's Brief at 10.

It is clear from the record that the

Plaintiff did contract to purchase the condominium and pay the
initial $500 down, in violation of the court's order restraining
the parties from disposing of marital assets, without the
defendant's consent or knowledge.

The parties disputed whether the

plaintiff permitted the defendant to put the other funds down, and
the court made no finding on that issue.

(R. 928-9).

The income amounts stated by the plaintiff in her brief refer
to the defendant's gross income, while the income imputed by the
trial court apparently refers to net income.

Plaintiff's Brief at

13.
Plaintiff also refers to a document, Defendant's Proposed
Findings of Fact, which was unverified, unsigned, and not part of
the record on appeal.
III.

Plaintiff's Brief at 12, 31.

LOWER COURT'S AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS IMPROPER
Plaintiff cites Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 p.2d 999 (Utah

App. 1988), for the proposition that "Filing a motion under Rule 59

3

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 'suspend the finality of the
judgment . . .'" In Anderson, the court dismissed an appeal for
lack of jurisdiction where the notice of appeal was filed prior to
the trial court's ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion.

The issue was

whether the appellate court had jurisdiction, not whether the trial
court had the authority to amend the findings in the case.

The

issue in the present matter is not whether the judgment was final,
but whether it was entered.
Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
"A judgment is complete

and shall be deemed entered for

all

purposes

. . . when the same is signed and filed . . ." [emphasis

added].

Here, the original judgment was entered on March 3, 1997,

before the trial court entered its amended findings.
The Plaintiff, in his brief, then goes on to argue that
"Pending entry of a final Judgement, the trial court has authority
to make additional findings or alter its judgment."
cited for this proposition.

No citation is

The Rules of Civil Procedure provide

only one method for the amendment of findings, and that is by
motion of the parties in Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civile
Procedure.
the entry

Said motion must be filed not later than 10 days after
of judgment. The judgment is considered complete when it

is entered.

Even if it were the case that the trial court could

freely amend its findings before the entry of its judgment, the
court had no authority to amend the findings as here its judgment
was already entered.
The Plaintiff further states that "the trial court is

4

certainly not bound to merely grant or deny the relief requested in
a Rule 59 Motion if it appears that additional findings may be
appropriate or necessary."

Again, no citation is provided.

The

defendant's motion to amend the findings only requested additional
findings as to the status of the Mountain Meadows Ranch as marital
or separate property (R. 418).

It did not request additional

findings regarding circumstances which required the award of a
disproportionate portion of the marital estate to the plaintiff.
The court denied the defendant's motion for additional findings.
Plaintiff's Brief at 15. The plaintiff did not properly file a
motion to amend the findings under Rule 52 (b), and that is the only
method provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the
findings.
IV. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT INCONSISTENT WITH
PRIOR FINDINGS AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
In regards to the court's amended finding that the defendant's
termination of his employment "deprived the Plaintiff of the
benefit of his income and the benefit of his retirement account had
he worked until he became entitled to full retirement benefits," it
is clear from the court's own findings and judgment that the
plaintiff was provided sufficient income for her needs.

Plaintiff

apparently argues that an increased sum of alimony would have been
awarded to her had the defendant continued to work.

In considering

the amount of alimony to award, the court shall consider "the
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income, and the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support." § 30-3-5 (7) Utah

5

Code Ann.

Here, the plaintiff has income of $540 per month,

receives $850 in rental income from the marital home awarded to her
free and clear, and $600 in alimony from the defendant.

With her

financial need of $2,000, she is provided income equal to her
expenses and no increased amount of alimony would have been
appropriate.

Further, the defendant, even if he had kept his

teaching position on a "regular" schedule, would not have had any
greater ability to pay alimony to the plaintiff.

His gross

income

would have been approximately $3,000 per month and he had monthly
expenses of $2,400.

Regardless of whether the defendant had

continued working as a school teacher, his actions would not have
"deprived the Plaintiff of the benefit of his income" as stated in
the court's findings.
Whether the defendant had continued to work would have been
largely irrelevant as far as any benefit received by the plaintiff
for the defendant's retirement account.

If the retirement benefits

had been split between the parties, the defendant would have had
less ability to pay alimony and the plaintiff's alimony award would
have to be reduced.

There was no testimony at trial as to what

amount the defendant would have received from his retirement
account on a monthly basis had he worked until retirement, but the
net value of the account, before taxes, only three years prior to
his retirement was less than $70,000.

Even if the defendant were

to receive income from the account in the amount of $3,000 per
month, his income while working on a "regular" schedule (which at
$36,000 per year would have exhausted the retirement account in
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less than two years), the amount of alimony would not have changed.
The size of the retirement account, which is less than 10% of the
marital estate, does not justify such a disproportionate award of
the marital estate.
The lower court in its amended findings found that:
Although some of [the retirement account] funds were used to
assist the Plaintiff with reference to acquisition of her
condominium, most of the funds were used to pay a debt
incurred in conjunction with the Defendant's opening a
business against the Plaintiff's will, while the parties were
still married, a[n] asset which, according to the Court's
findings, now has no value. In essence, the Defendant
dissipated almost all of that retirement account. Plaintiff
should receive a greater balance of the marital estate (R.
509) .
Again, the amount of the retirement account, which had a net pretax value of less than $70,000, is less than 10% of the value of
the marital estate.

Such a small amount is insufficient to justify

the award of 97.75% of the marital estate to the plaintiff.
Further, this finding is inconsistent with the court's other
findings and findings at trial.

The lower court found that the

funds from the retirement account were used to "refinance the Arma
Coating business and also to put a substantial down payment on the
Condominium which the Plaintiff is now occupying."

(R. 503). The

trial court acknowledged the "responsibility that [the defendant]
felt he had to provide for his then ex-wife's housing needs in a
manner appropriate to her standard of living."

(R. 503). At

trial, when counsel for the defendant sought to further expand on
the issue of the liquidation of the retirement account and the
defendant's efforts to preserve the funds that the plaintiff had
invested in the condominium, the court stated that:
7

Counsel, let me ask you about this because I — I may be
missing something, but the condo had a stipulated value for
purposes of this trial of $135,000. At the time that Myrlene
Lytle determined to acquire that condo, she put $500 down on
it, and by her own testimony, did not discuss that with
Clinton Lytle. However, when the $4,500 to make the rest of
the $5,000 down payment was needed, that was acquired through
the tax return refund.
The balance of the loan obtained by Mr. Lytle in his best
efforts and that now accounts for the purchase of the condo
(R. 928) .
After counsel for the defendant explained why he wished to further
delve into this issue, the court found that:
And it makes perfectly good sense to me for them not to walk
away from $5,000. It makes a very reasonable economic
decision on Mr. Lytle's part not to lose that money when it's
tied up in a tangible asset such as the condo. I do not think
there's a dispute over that.
I fault
neither
of these parties
for having taken that effort,
number one, not to lose the $5,000, and, number two, make sure
that Mrs. Lytle has a reasonable dwelling that is
approximating her standard of living during the marriage. It
makes perfectly good sense to me, counsel, and I just don't
know why we have to talk about it so much, [emphasis added]
(R. 928-9) .
In this matter, the plaintiff invested $500 of marital funds to
purchase a condominium without the plaintiff's permission.

This

violated the court's order regarding the disposition of marital
assets.

The parties disagreed, and the court made no finding,

whether the next $4,500 put down on the condo was done with the
defendant's consent.

It is clear from the record that the

defendant did not sign the income refund tax check.

(R. 929). In

order to preserve those deposited funds, the defendant paid off a
loan on the Arma-Coating business in order to obtain a mortgage on
the condominium (R. 665, 745).

At trial, the court found fault

with neither of the parties for their actions.

8

Further, the liquidation of the retirement account did not
violate a court order.

The order in question, entered August 29,

1995, restrained each party "from transferring or disposing" of any
property unless the other party consents.

(R. 109). Although the

defendant liquidated the retirement account, there is no evidence
that he transferred or disposed of it without the consent of the
plaintiff.

The stipulation of the parties, entered into evidence,

states that the defendant could use "his retirement to pay off a
loan to Arma Coating and is borrowing $130,000 to complete purchase
of Myrlene's new condo."

(R. 595). The stipulation states that

the defendant "could use" the retirements funds for that purpose,
not that he had already used them.
Further, the funds used to pay the Arma-Coating business debt
were not dissipated.

The debt was paid in order for the defendant

to obtain a loan to purchase the condominium.

Arma-Coating was a

marital asset and the debts thereon were marital debts.

Although

the business was found by the lower court to have a net value of
$0, if the debts had not been paid it would have had a negative net
value.

Thus the funds from the retirement account were used to pay

a marital debt, and regardless of whether the funds were used for
that purpose the net value of the marital estate would have
remained the same.
In regards to the court's finding that the plaintiff "is
clearly unable to support herself at the standard of living to
which she is entitled with the amount of alimony awarded by the
Court and her own earned income," and that she "still falls
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approximately $900 short each month of being able to meet her
financial needs/' this finding ignores the fact the plaintiff
receives $850 in income from the rental of the marital home, which
she was awarded free and clear.

The court included this factor in

its award of alimony in paragraph 41 of its findings, and also
found that "Plaintiff also has the building lot which is probably
worth something that she could sell and live off of for quite a
while and maybe not even have to work for a period of time. . . ."
(R. 508) .
The lower court's finding that "technically, the Plaintiff may
not have acquired a financial interest in the Mountain Meadows
Ranch because of work she performed on that property during the
parties marriage and while it was still titled in the name of the
Defendant's parents, her contribution toward that asset ought to be
considered and supports the Court's ultimate award of marital
property", is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to Utah law.
Any contribution made towards the ranch was made while it was owned
by someone else.

As the plaintiff can not claim any legal interest

in the ranch, she seeks to be awarded an equitable interest.

There

is no Utah case or statute under which an equitable interest in the
property could be awarded to the plaintiff.

There is no evidence

at trial that the defendant or his parents intended such an
interest to be awarded to the plaintiff.

Nor is there any evidence

that the plaintiff's contribution in any way enhanced the value of
ranch or increased the chance that the defendant would inherit it.
Further, the plaintiff's contribution towards that asset was

10

minimal.

From the plaintiff's testimony, it appears that she may

have assisted in harvesting gardens, canning, and feeding the cows
briefly when the defendant was ill with a heart condition.

She

also rode on the back of a tractor while the defendant worked.
Most of her testimony on this issue is in regards to the
defendant's efforts on the ranch, rather than her own.

The

transcript of the plaintiff's testimony in this regard is attached
in the addendum to this brief.

(R. 706-9).

Such contributions are

insufficient to provide for such an inequitable distribution of the
parties's estate, especially when considering that the plaintiff's
parents, by inter vivos gift, transferred to the parties 40 acres
of real estate with a current value of $1,500,000.

This fully

compensated the plaintiff for any "contribution" made to the ranch.
The plaintiff, in her brief, misconstrues the holding of
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

There, the

parties at trial requested that the lower court provide them with
guidance by deciding whether certain shares of stock, donated to
the husband, should be considered in their settlement negotiations.
The court ruled that the stock "is property of the marriage and
should be taken into consideration by the court in dividing all
marital property on a fair and equitable basis."
P.2d at 305.

Mortensen, 760

The parties later stipulated that the husband should

receive the shares of stock, but only one-third of the marital
estate.
The husband appealed the trial court's ruling regarding the
stock.

The Supreme Court stated that a two-thirds award to the

11

Defendant may not have been inequitable based upon (1) the superior
education and income of the husband, (2) the fact that three minor
children of the parties lived at home, (3) the wife waived her
right to alimony, (4) the wife's agreement to a reduced amount of
child support, and (5) the fact that the husband was awarded his
entire retirement account.
Those factors relevant to Mortensen are not present in the
instant matter.

The defendant had only three years until full

retirement, at which time his superior education would not have
yielded a superior income.

There were no minor children of the

parties and the plaintiff sought, and received, an award of
alimony.

Further, the retirement account in this case was used for

the mutual benefit of the parties and was exhausted before trial.
The court in Mortensen found that "In view of these factors,
it would not have inequitable for the trial court to award
plaintiff two-thirds of the remaining property and defendant one-

third, giving
shares

of

no weight at all

stock."

to the fact

[emphasis added]

that he received

his

Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 309.

The court thus did not consider the separate property as
justification for the disproportionate award.

This comports with

the courts discussion of gifted or inherited property, quoted here
at length as a concise summary of pertinent Utah law on the issue:
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable"
property division pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should, in
accordance with the rule prevailing in most other
jurisdictions and with the division made in many of our own
cases, generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift
and inheritance during the marriage . . . to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value,
unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her own efforts or
12

expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the property
has been consumed or its identify lost through commingling or
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse. ££. Jesperson v.
Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). An exception to this
rule would be where part or all of the gift or inheritance is
awarded to the nondonee or nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony
as was done in Weaver v. Weaver, supra. The remaining
property should be divided equitably between the parties as in
other divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict
mathematical equality. Teece v. Teecer 715 P.2d 106 (Utah

1986) . However, in making that division,
the donee or heir
spouse should not lose the benefit
of his or her gift or
inheritance
by the trial court's automatically
or
arbitrarily
awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the remaining
property which was acquired by their joint efforts
to
offset
the gifts or inheritance.
[emphasis added]
Mortensenr 760 P.2d at 308.

In her brief, the plaintiff, without

citing authority, states that "Clearly, a trial court should
consider a party's separate property in fashioning its equitable
award of marital property."

(Respondent's Brief, 28). This is

directly contrary to the directions to trial courts given above.
The court in Mortensen went on to discuss those factors that
could result in such a disproportionate award: eliminating the need
for alimony or support for the nondonee spouse and to provide
housing for the children.

Neither of these factors is present in

the instant matter.
These rules, states the court, "preserve and give effect to
the right that married persons have always had in this state to
separately own and enjoy property" and "accords with the normal
intent of donors or deceased persons that their gifts and
inheritances be kept within their family and succession should not
be diverted because of divorce."

Mortensen. 760 P.2d at 308-9.
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The defendant's rights in this case and the intentions of his
parents have been foiled by the trial court.
Plaintiff notes that Mortensen cites to Weaver v. Weaver, 442
P.2d 928 (Utah 1968), and others, as cases where the court approved
of a disproportionate award of the marital estate.
parties had accumulated assets of $750,000.
half of the estate to each party.

In Weaver, the

The court awarded one-

The plaintiff in that case was

completely disabled and the she was not awarded alimony.

The

defendant claimed that $500,000 of the total estate should not have
been equitably divided, as a "considerable portion" of those assets
had been acquired by purchase and gift from his father and sister.
It is not clear where the remainder of the fund associated with the
$500,000 came from.

After reviewing the record, the court could

not say that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and was
inclined to the view that the record supported the findings and
conclusions of the court below.

The court made no finding that the

$500,000 was not part of the marital estate as claimed by the
defendant.

Weaver is thus not a case of an inequitable

distribution as claimed by the plaintiff.

Factually, the present

case is dissimilar as the plaintiff here is not disabled and was
awarded alimony.
The plaintiff in her brief states that "The trial court did
not divide the parties' marital estate based on a strict
mathematical formula and is not required to do so."

For this

proposition, plaintiff cites Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah
1986).

In that case, the defendant argued that his share of the

14

down-payment in a home, which totaled $6,500, came from a premarital asset.
equally.

The trial court divided the equity in the home

The defendant claimed that he should have been reimbursed

for his premarital contribution before dividing the equity.

The

Supreme Court found conflicting evidence as to whether the down
payment was from premarital funds, but found that:
even if we accept as true the defendant's testimony as the
source of the $6,500 contribution, the difference in the
contributions made by the two parties was no so great as to
give rise to any abuse of discretion of the trial court.
Mathematical equality in the division of each marital property
is not required.
Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d at 107.

The court in Teece was not

approving of a radical and disproportionate distribution of the
marital estate.

In that case, the amount of money in dispute was

minor, and the court held that the equitable distribution did not
have be a strictly mathematical 50/50 split.

Here, the value of

the estate awarded to the plaintiff above her one-half share is
more than $300,000.

The language in Teece was not intended to be,

and has not been, used to uphold such a inequitable distributions.
"Mathematical equality" may not be required, but Teece does not
remove the requirement of equality itself in the distribution of
assets.
V.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER RANCH
In fashioning an equitable award of property, the factors

generally to be considered by trial courts are:
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the
source of the property; the health of the parties; the
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions,
needs, and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the
15

children of the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of
marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the
marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division
has with the amount of alimony and child support to be
awarded.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

In relation to the

above factors, there is a substantial estate in this case, the
marital estate was acquired during the marriage, the entire net
value of the marital estate was acquired by inter vivos gift from
the defendant's parents, both parties are in adequate health but
are nearing retirement age, and the defendant may have some
financial need which is remedied by the courts award of alimony.
None of these factors supports a disproportionate award.

These

factors to be considered by trial courts do specifically not
include the presence of an equitable interest in inherited
property.
VI.

PROPERTY AWARD DID NOT ACHIEVE FAIR, JUST EQUITABLE RESULT
The plaintiff claims that the property distribution in this

case achieves a fair, just, and equitable result and cites
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994), which in
turn cited Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1990).

Neither of

these cases deals with the "fair, just and equitable" exception to
the general rule that each party in should receive the real and
personal property he or she inherited during the marriage.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 306; Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706
(Utah 1982) .

In Finlayson, there was a dispute regarding whether a

certain debt was a gift or a loan from one of the parties' parents.
There was not any dispute whether any separate property justified a
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disproportionate award of the marital estate.

In Dunn, the trial

court allowed the defendant a credit for separate property which
was later consumed and commingled.
held that this was improper.

The appellate court properly

This clearly has no application to

the present matter, as the defendant did not acquire the ranch
until after the parties divorce and had no opportunity to consume
or otherwise lose the ranch's identity through commingling or
exchanges.

That is essentially a question of whether the ranch is

separate or marital property, and the Plaintiff has here conceded
that the ranch is separate property.

Defendant's Brief, 5, 13.

The trial court in Dunn also awarded 76% of the marital estate
to the defendant and 24% to the plaintiff.

That award, as in the

present case, was based upon a factor not included in Burke, supra.
Although the award in Dunn is less inequitable than in the present
case, the decision was remanded and the trial court instructed to:
first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the
marital estate or as the separate property of one of the other

. . . . Each party is then presumed to be entitled
his her separate property and fifty percent of the
property,

to all of
marital

[emphasis added]

Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323.
The court in Dunn, when stating the "fair, just and equitable"
language on which the defendant principally relies to justify the
inequitable distribution in this case, cites only to Noble v.
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).

In that case, the court approved

of the award of the husband's separate property to the wife because
the husband shot the wife in the head at close range with a rifle
while she was lying on their bed.
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While any distribution could be

justified as "fair, just and equitable," examination of the
reasoning behind that standard, evidenced in Noble, leaves no doubt
that such a rationale is inapplicable to this case.
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the trial
court awarded a disproportionate portion of the marital estate to
the plaintiff, apparently due to the fact that the defendant had
substantial inherited property.

The appellate court held that the

same was improper without additional findings and remanded the case
to the district court.

The plaintiff cites from Burt language that

the court may award an interest in inherited property to the nonheir spouse in "other extraordinary situations where equity so
demands." citing Mortensenf 760 P.2d at 308.

Note that the

extraordinary situation is one which equity "demands" such a
result.

Mortensen provides that:

The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated property,
particulary if it is income producing, may be properly be
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by
that spouse or as a source of income for the payment of child
support or alimony (where awarded) by that spouse. Such
property might also be utilized to provide housing for minor
children in other utilized in other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands.
Id.

Justice Zimmerman, in his concurring opinion, stated that
The overarching general rule remains the same in any divorce
case: to provide adequate support for the children of the
marriage, Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), and to
divide the economic assets and income stream of the parties so
as to permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage as
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage. See eg. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373
(Utah 1988) .

Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 310.

The other "extraordinary situations"

described in the Mortensen opinion all deal with alimony and minor
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children.

This is in accord with Justice Zimmerman's concurrence.

However, in this case there are no minor children of the parties.
Further, the defendant is awarded a home and substantial other
assets, all debt free, to maintain her at her standard of living
during the marriage.
Justice Zimmerman's concurrence cited Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) as an example of where equity demanded that
the separate property of one party be awarded to the other spouse.
Noble, the case where the husband disabled the wife by shooting her
in the head with a rifle, was cited above as the root of the "fair,
just and equitable" language found in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 843
(Utah App. 1990).
The court's finding that the plaintiff's contributions to the
ranch equitably requires that she be awarded the entire marital
estate is fundamentally only an argument that the ranch should be
included in the marital estate.

Her efforts prior to the ranch

being deeded to the defendant are irrelevant.

If she had performed

these actions and the defendant had not received the ranch from his
parents, would she then claim that she should receive 97.75% of the
marital estate?

The key factor in the court's decision is

therefore not whether the plaintiff contributed to the ranch, but
whether the defendant received it, and that is impermissible under
Mortensen.
VII.

LOWER COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER RANCH
The plaintiff correctly states the rule regarding whether the

trial court has jurisdiction over property: was it "any right that
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has accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit."
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

From

the record it is apparent that defendant did not obtain title to
the ranch until 1997, after the parties divorce. The defective deed
from his parents estate was not even recorded until February of
1995, a month after the parties separation.

Any right he had to

any present or future benefit did not accrue until after the
marriage.

Plaintiff notes in her brief that his interest in the

ranch was not "technically a present benefit."
35-6.

Plaintiff's Brief,

However, as the defendant did not have good title to the

property at the time of divorce, the future benefit did not
"accrue," as a legally enforceable claim, until after the marriage.
Plaintiff, in her brief, quotes the defendant's testimony at trial
that it was his "understanding that [he] would

receive" the ranch,

[emphasis added] (R. 651, 652). This again confirms that the
defendant would, at some future time, accrue some present or future
benefit, but that he had not received the same at the time of
trial.
For marital assets to be distributed, the assets must be in
the possession of one, or both, of the marital parties.
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1996).

Endrody v.

The court in

Endrody stated that "While possession usually connotes physical
possession, we believe it also connotes legal possession."

Jd.

the time of trial in this matter, the defendant did not have
rightful legal possession of the ranch and the same could not be
awarded or considered by the trial court.
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At

VIII.

ALIMONY AWARD INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS ACTION
The defendant does not have the ability to pay alimony, and

the plaintiff is awarded sufficient property to meet her needs.
Even if she were only awarded one-half of the parties' estate, she
would receive a home and $200,000 of other property debt-free.
Under the trial court's inequitable property division, she receives
over $650,000 of property, again without encumbrance.

All of the

property was derivative of inter-vivos gifts from the defendant's
parents.

In these circumstances, alimony is inappropriate.

See

Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973).
The plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not mention
that the defendant was remarried and his spouse contributes toward
the payment of his living expenses.

Plaintiff's Brief at 36.

However, the defendant, in his testimony at trial included this
factor in the calculation of his living expenses.

R. 943.

Again,

counsel for the plaintiff is seeking to introduce a factor into the
court's decision which is simply not present.
IX.

IMPUTATION OF INCOME IMPROPER
The trial court failed to make any specific finding that the

defendant was unemployed or underemployed in ordered to impute
income. Section 78-45-7 of the Utah Code requires that "income may
not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the
amount of imputed income or a hearing is held and a finding made
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed."

In

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), this standard was
applied to imputation of income for both child support and alimony
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purposes.

The plaintiff quotes Hall to the extent that § 78-45-

7(a) "does not specifically require a 'finding' of underemployment,
to parrot the exact language of the statute," without quoting the
remainder of that sentence, which reads "it is well established
that where a statute expressly requires a trial court to make a
threshold finding before taking specified judicial action, the
trial court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first
making the legislatively mandated finding."

858 P.2d at 1024.

The findings of the trial court "do not become relevant until
after it determines, as a threshold matter, that income should be
imputed because the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed as required by" statute.

Hall, 1018 P.2d at 1024.

Absent such a specific finding, the trial court may be
affirmed only if the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the
factor or factors on which findings are missing or if the
statutorily mandated findings are implied.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018.

Here, however, at the time of trial Defendant was 60 years old (R.
713, 714). The principal at Defendant's former school testified
that it was unusual for someone to still be teaching at age 60 (R.
717) .
The court found that the Defendant "is working hard to make
[the marital business] profitable. . . ." (R. 505). The Defendant
worked more than forty hours per week for the business after he
stopped teaching, but did not receive a salary (R. 678, 743). The
trial court found that "Defendant is working more than full-time at
the two businesses, the Boat Shop, now known as High Desert Marine,
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and the Arma-Coating business, and is making a good faith and
genuine effort to produce income at the same or hopefully even
above the levels that he enjoyed while he was teaching." (R. 504).
Further reasons given by the defendant for his not resuming his
teaching position are given in the addendum attached hereto.

(R.

706-7).
With these findings and evidence, the undisputed evidence does
not clearly establish the factor or factors on which findings are
missing or that the statutorily mandated findings are implied.
CONCLUSION
The lower court in this case did not have the power to amend
the findings after the judgment had already been entered.

Those

additional findings are unsupported by the evidence and contrary to
the courts prior findings.

The plaintiff was awarded property and

alimony sufficient to meet her needs as found by the trial court.
Defendant's retirement account was utilized for the benefit of the
parties and with the stipulation of the plaintiff.

At trial, the

court did not fault the defendant for the liquidation of the
account and found his actions to save the money the plaintiff had
deposited on the condominium, against court order, to be
reasonable.

In any case, the retirement account, which was worth

less than 10% of the marital estate is not sufficient grounds to
make the inequitable distribution of the parties assets in this
case.
The trial court included the value of the ranch inherited by
the defendant from his parents in distributing the marital estate.
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Consequently, the defendant received 2.25% of the substantial
marital estate, which consisted almost entirely of assets derived
from an inter vivos gift of 40 acres of property from defendant's
parents.

This gift from the defendant's parents would be worth

over $1,500,000 in current property values.

The trial court

awarded essentially the entire net value of the martial estate, all
of which is derived from gifts from the defendants parents, to the
plaintiff.

The defendant, after paying the debts of the parties,

is left with a ranch which has been in his family for several
generation but produces no income.

This offset by the trial court

deprives the defendant, Clint Lytle, of the benefit of his
inheritance and foils the testamentary intent of his parents, Ezra
and Mae Lytle.
If there are facts that could justify such a result, they are
not present in this case.

Instances where courts have acted to

award separate property to the nondonee or nonheir spouse have
always included an element of support for children or support for a
spouse that is unable to support him or herself.

Here, there are

no minor children and the plaintiff, even if she were to only
receive 50% of the marital estate, has property sufficient property
to meet her needs.
Although trial courts do not have to divide the marital estate
with strict mathematical equality, equality is still required.
court's distribution of the marital estate in this matter is not
equitable as required by § 30-3-5 of the Utah Code.
equitable is that the distribution be equal.
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The root of

The property

The

distribution in this case should be reversed and the marital estate
equitably divided as provided in the Defendant's Brief.
There was no finding by the trial court that the defendant was
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

In any case, it was

inappropriate for the trial court to award alimony here as the
plaintiff was provided with property sufficient to meet her
financial needs.

For these reasons, the award of alimony should be

reversed.
DATED this 20th day of October, 1997.

SAMUEL G. DRAPER, ''FOR
HUGHES & READ
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Samuel G. Draper, certify that on October 20, 1997 I served
a copy of the attached Brief upon G. Michael Westfall, the counsel
for the appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by first
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:
G. Michael Westfall
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770

Samuel G. Draper

25

ADDENDUM: PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY REGARDING^^NCH
954500316 VOL. I 10-10-96
1

Q.

-- Mountain Meadows property?

2

A.

We always helped out.

We had to take care

3

of the cattle, and Clint loved to work the ground

4

and to plow.

5

the hay.

6

tractors day after day and worked with him, but he

7

And he didn't like the hay, hauling of

It was hard, but I rode with him on the

- - w e did everything.

8

We worked around his working time and

9

stuff, but his -- his dad and mom were getting old

10

and they were having a really hard time being able

11

to do it.

12

with his hip from the time he was a boy, and it was

13

getting worse, and it was harder for him to walk.

14

And so the kids and I were all the help that Clint

15

had, and we worked at the ranch.

His dad had had a hip -- something wrong

16

Q.

The kids and I, your children?

17

A.

Yes, my children.

18

Q.

Did Clint's parents live at the ranch?

19

A.

Yes, they lived there in the summers.

20

the winter they moved downtown because it was too

21

cold for them.

22
23

Q.

In

And you indicate that -- that Clint helped

out with the plowing --

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

-- things like that?

Did you also
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1

personally help out in terms of operating and

2

maintaining the ranch?

3

A.

Yes.

Yes.

4

Q.

What did you do?

5

A.

I learned to drive the tractor, this

6

little red tractor, and I remember we were down in

7

the fields and Clint was showing me how.

8

remember that he got a little bit upset with me.

9

When he got back to the house his dad told him or

And I

10

his mother, one of them, told him to be patient with

11

me, I'd never driven a tractor before, but I did

12

learn to drive a tractor.

13

he was disking and I would do the planting.

14

would drive while we were loading the hay, and I've

15

even hauled a truck and trailer to town with hay on

16

it.

17
18
19

And I did follow him when
And I

And I just worked right along with him.
Q.

Okay.

And this was primarily during the

summer months?
A.

Yes.

Uh-huh.

We had to move the cows

20

twice a year from the summer division to the

21

winter -- (inaudible) -- and one year we rode

22

horses and it was a three-day drive.

23

times we loaded them in the truck and brought them

24

back and then took them out, and I was always with

25

Clint, always.

And other

b
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971

224
954500316
1
2
3

Q.

Okay.
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And was this work primarily done on

weekends or was it done during the week?
A.

It was done on weekends and after school

4

when he was teaching and then on every weekend we

5

were up there working.

6

done.

7

also put in big gardens, and we had to harvest those

8

gardens.

9

day and go home at night, and I'd take something

It had -- it had to be

Shawn was helping lift the hay.

And they

And I know that we'd go up and work all

10

home that I'd have to be up all night canning and

11

then come up the next morning and --

12
13

Q.

So the canning you would take all the way

back to St. George to take care of?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Okay.

Did -- would Clint stay overnight

16

up at the ranch or did you pretty much the family

17

would come back, go home?

18

A.

Well, in the summertime we pretty much

19

stayed up there, and in the wintertime we -- when he

20

had to be to school the next morning, we would go

21

back and forth.

22

Q.

So during the summer times, did the whole

23

family -- did you actually live up there on the

24

Mountain Meadows property?

25

A.

Yeah, pretty much kind of, especially when

c
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1

we were in California.

2

summer vacation, and we would just be working up

3

there.

And we just stayed up there.

Q.

4

We'd come up during the

So how long did this go on with you

5

helping out to maintain and to operate the farming,

6

ranching operations out on the Mountain Meadows

7

property?
A.

8
9

It went on until Clint moved out in '95,

and I helped.

I helped with the cows.

When he was

10

ill with his heart surgery and his shoulder surgery

11

and those other things, no one was around to feed

12

the cows, and so I'd have to back the big trailer --

13

I'd drive the tractor, but I'd back the big trailer

14

up to the hay stack and try to roll the bails off on

15

to the trailer because they were too heavy for me to

16

lift.

17

the cows and come back down.

18

quite awhile whi le he was sick to help out.

And then I'd drive the tractor up and feed
And I did this for

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I loved to go up and ride the tractor with

We d go up at rnqht in his -- the new big

21

him.

22

tractor that was enclosed in and we' d ride in that

23

and bail hay.

24
25

Q.

There was a portions of the Dixie Downs

prop erty, the original 40 acres that have been sold

d
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ADDENDUM: DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TEACHING3
954500316 VOL. II 10-11-96
1

factor.

2

Q.

Okay.

Have alimony expenses been paid out

3

of the boat shop, the alimony that you have paid to

4

Ms. Lytle?

5

A.

The sources that have come for a lot of

6

the alimony and the items that have paid off have

7

come a lot of it from Arma Coating, and then in one

8

of the times -- you know, we talked about, you know,

9

that times were rougher -- (inaudible) -- about

10

paying things off.

11

so that

these

things

I run up $12,000 on credit cards
wouldn't be late.

12

Q.

The alimony?

13

A.

Pardon?

14

Q.

The alimony?

15

A.

So the alimony, the house payments, and

16

they've still been late, but I have run up an extra

17

12,000 trying to keep up and it's been -- it hasn't

18

been all roses.

19

Q.

Okay.

Mr. Lytle, we're going -- we're

20

going to touch on alimony next.

21

resumed your position as a teacher?

22
23

A.

Why have you not

I think there's several reasons.

The last

-- the last few years have been extremely

24

strenuous.

Both my parents died, the items with my

25

sisters was extremely difficult.

I've been on
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extended.

2

Now, to some people that's not a lot, but

3

it's very -- it keeps you very, very busy.

4

the ranch.

5

in the day have been very long, and it reached a

6

point where I was having a hard time keeping up with

7

all of my commitments.

I've worked the boat shop.

I've run

So the hours

8

As I talked to the superintendent, and

9

those are the people that know me, know that I'm

10

committed to schools, and I have always said whether

11

age or whether sickness or whatever it might be, if

12

the day comes when I can't give 100 percent to my

13

kids, I'm not going to be there, and I wasn't.

14

It's been extremely difficult listening to

15

the crap that I've had to put up with the teachers

16

talking about, oh, yeah, he's been doing this, he's

17

been doing that, the conversations from school to

18

school.

19

were a parent, I would say, do I want my kid in that

20

class?

21

It has not been an easy situation.

If I

Although I know what my moral standards

22

are and so does my stake president, I could not say

23

to a parent, hey, this is the way it should be.

24

need to leave your kid here.

25

difficult because I did not feel I could give 110

I felt that would be
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